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Abstract
In this article, I set out to explore the possibility of a shared life between two places
in the highlands of Pakistan and Tajikistan—a region dissected by Afghanistan’s
narrow Wakhan corridor, by present-day nation-state boundaries, by historical
divisions between Central and South Asia, and by a former Cold War frontier.
Moving away from a take on conviviality as specifically tied to urban spaces and
face-to-face encounters, I attempt to trace the processes that determine the
coming and going of shared modes of being. In doing so, I first situate the two
places—Karimabad and Khorog—in their respective post-Cold War borderlands
and point to their historically ambivalent status as ‘marginal’ places at the
frontier, culturally diverse ‘hubs’, and sites of globalization. Then I analyse the
historical build-up—material and ideological—that led to the establishment of
specific forms of connection and disconnection between the two places. In the last
part of the article, I discuss how people in and from Karimabad and Khorog seek
out opportunities to attain shared instances of common sociality, which often
remain ephemeral and subject to regimes of power. Finally, I argue that the
∗ This article is based on repeated fieldwork stays in Tajikistan from 2008 to 2013,
and in Pakistan from 2012 to 2015. All interlocutors have been anonymized, with
pseudonyms used in place of their real names. My heartfelt thanks go to them, and to
Brook Bolander, Brian Donahoe, Magnus Marsden, Madeleine Reeves, and the four
anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. I would furthermore like to express
my gratitude to Daniel Beben for important insights regarding Nasir-i Khusraw.
For comments on an earlier version of this article, I am also deeply indebted to
the members of the Religion & Globalization cluster at the Asia Research Institute,
National University of Singapore, as well as to the participants of the workshop
‘Conviviality Beyond the Urban Centre: Theorizing the “Marginal Hub”’ at the 2016
InterAsian Connections V conference in Seoul. I would also like to thank the Hong
Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Hong Kong,
for support throughout the writing process and the Swiss National Science Foundation
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2 TILL MOSTOWLANSKY
cases of these two ‘marginal hubs’ highlight the importance of looking beyond
the conventional ‘imperial centre’ when debating the dynamics that lead people
to desire, create, and abandon ties across difference.
Introduction
Much of the literature on conviviality is based on two central
assumptions. First, a number of authors have observed that living
together across difference is a typical feature of urban spaces. In this
respect, many studies have examined social encounters in past and
present cities from southern Europe to South Africa and from Great
Britain to Australia. Second, within this framework of shared urban
lives, conviviality remains conceptually tied to ideas of proximity,
density, continuity, and, sometimes, as Paul Gilroy notes, to ‘the
realization of a more worthwhile liberalism’.1 Yet how far do these
assumptions take us in understanding difference in places beyond
the pre-defined urban centre? What role do face-to-face encounters
play in a world marked by both the use of translocal resources and
technologies and the political form of the nation state? And what does
itmean to think of convivialitymore generally as, inMagnusMarsden’s
words, ‘the ways in which life in culturally complex settings generates
indeterminate modes of being that valorise the ability of people to
forge relations, ties, and to join in practices across boundaries’?2
In this article, I examine these questions using the example of
two places—one in Pakistan and the other in Tajikistan—and their
1 P. Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?, Routledge, London, 2004,
p. 162. See also A. Amin, Land of Strangers, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2012. A. Bell,
‘Decolonizing Conviviality and Becoming Ordinary: Cross-Cultural Face-To-Face
Encounters in Aotearoa, New Zealand’Ethnic and Racial Studies 39(7), 2016, pp. 1170–
1186. I. Brudvig, Conviviality in Bellville: An Ethnography of Space, Place, Mobility and
Being in Urban South Africa, Langaa, Bamenda, 2014. U. Freitag, ‘Cosmopolitanism
and Conviviality? Some Conceptual Considerations Concerning the Late Ottoman
Empire’ European Journal of Cultural Studies 17(4), 2014, pp. 375–391. P. Gilroy,
Postcolonial Melancholia, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005. J. Overing and
A. Passes, ‘Preface’ in The Anthropology of Love and Anger: The Aesthetics of Conviviality
in Native Amazonia, J. Overing and A. Passes (eds.), Routledge, London, 2000.
B. Padilla, J. Azevedo, and A. Olmos-Alcaraz, ‘Superdiversity and Conviviality:
Exploring Frameworks for Doing Ethnography in Southern European Intercultural
Cities’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 38(4), 2015, pp. 621–635. A. Wise and S. Velayutham,
‘Conviviality in Everyday Multiculturalism: Some Brief Comparisons between
Singapore and Sydney’ European Journal of Cultural Studies 17(4), 2014, pp. 406–430.
2 M. Marsden, Trading Worlds: Afghan Merchants Across Modern Frontiers, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 290.
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Figure 1: The borderlands of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.
inhabitants’ historically complex and discontinuous relations with one
another. Both Karimabad in Pakistan and Khorog in Tajikistan are
located at the frontier of Central and South Asia (see Figure 1),
which has long been marked by processes of separation in the course
of colonial, Cold War, and post-Cold War history.3 Starting with
the delineation of the Afghan Wakhan corridor at the end of the
nineteenth century—buffering the Russian and British empires—
followed by the Soviet militarization of the border and hesitant
attempts at post-Cold War integration, cross-border connectivity in
the borderlands of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan has
remained tied to specific moments and locales in time and space. As
3 See S. Chari and K. Verdery, ‘Thinking Between the Posts: Postcolonialism,
Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War’ Comparative Studies in Society
and History 51(1), 2009, pp. 6–34. H. Kwon, The Other Cold War, Columbia University
Press, New York, 2010. M. Marsden and B. D. Hopkins, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier,
Hurst, London, 2011. T. Mostowlansky, ‘Building Bridges across the Oxus: Language,
Development and Globalization at the Tajik-Afghan Frontier’, International Journal of
the Sociology of Language 247, 2017.
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a result, these borderlands have predominantly been viewed either
through the eyes of the respective nation states that dissect the area
or in light of transregional integration between Central Asia, South
Asia, and China.4 The exploration of the possibility of shared lives
across the frontier, or the lack thereof, has been largely neglected.5
In the course of fieldwork I have conducted since 2008, I have
encountered many people in the borderlands of Pakistan and
Tajikistan for whom this state of disconnection is simply part of
their everyday lives. To think, act, and travel across the border is
not a frequent occurrence and requires conscious effort. Nevertheless,
many of these same people also express an underlying sense that
they are part of a broader common region through which their
ancestors used to travel relatively freely, and that they share significant
historical, cultural, and religious connections with other people
in the broader region. Ideas of conviviality, and their infrequent
materialization, remain under the surface, hidden but ready to
be activated. For instance, after a bloody military intervention by
Tajikistan’s government in Khorog in 2012, angry youngmen recalled
their genealogical ties to territories and people in the neighbouring
borderlands outside the Tajik nation state. While not explicitly linked
to an alternate form of statehood, this remembrance of a common past
projected bygone forms of living together into the future. Similarly,
during my research in Karimabad, elderly people told me that they
have always had to defend themselves against unjustified suspicions
that they wanted to build a separate, cross-border state in the region.
4 For a detailed overview of existing studies on the borderlands, seeH.Kreutzmann,
Pamirian Crossroads: Kirgiz and Wakhi of High Asia, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2015. For
broader takes on transregional integration, see M. Laruelle, S. Peyrouse, J. Huchet,
and B. Balci (eds.), China and India in Central Asia: A New ‘Great Game’?, Palgrave, New
York, 2010. M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse (eds.),Mapping Central Asia: Indian Perceptions
and Strategies. Ashgate, Farnham and Burlington, 2011.
5 Exceptions focusing on the broader region include Kreutzmann, Pamirian
Crossroads. S. Levi-Sanchez,TheAfghan-Central Asia Borderland: The State and Local Leaders,
Routledge, London and New York, 2017. E. Manetta, ‘Journey into Paradise: Tajik
Representations of Afghan Badakhshan’ Central Asian Survey 30(4), 2011, pp. 371–
387. M. Marsden, ‘Muslim Cosmopolitans? Transnational Life in Northern Pakistan’
The Journal of AsianStudies67(1),2008, pp. 213–247. A. Remtilla, ‘Re-Producing Social
Relations: Political and Economic Change and Islam in Post-Soviet Tajik Ishkashim’,
PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2012. A. Rippa, ‘Across the Khunjerab Pass: A
Rhizomatic Ethnography along the Karakoram Highway, between Xinjiang (China)
and Pakistan’, PhD diss., University of Aberdeen, 2015. J. Steinberg, Ismaʼili Modern:
Globalization and Identity in a Muslim Community, University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill, 2011.
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Such accusations, not to mentionmore casual cross-border musings,
feed on the fact that people in Karimabad and Khorog, as well as in
many other places in the borderlands of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan,
and Tajikistan, are Nizari Ismaili Muslims whose transnational
institutions are headed by their 49th Imam, Prince Shah Karim Al
Hussaini, the Aga Khan IV. As I will discuss later in this article,
being part of the transnational Ismaili community is an important
factor when people reach out beyond the boundaries of the nation
state. However, as I will also argue, what it means to be Ismaili
remains contested. Local identity has not simply dissolved into an
abstract transnational form, but continues to be bound to places in
this borderland area that—located at the fringes of empires andnation
states—has never attained a common name.
People in Karimabad and Khorog are keenly aware of their
positioning at this historically and geopolitically salient, yet
marginalized, crossroads. As I will show in the following sections, they
not only aptly navigate the different scales that emerge within this
constellation, but also participate in the making of such scales. In
this respect, Willem van Schendel’s notion of ‘Zomia’ as a possible
alternative geopolitical entity comprising the border zones in the
highlands of Southeast Asia6 is particularly evocative, as is Anna
Tsing’s emphasis on the importance of local people’s involvement
in ‘scale-making projects’7 that are embedded in different power
relations.8 I suggest that my interlocutors themselves were in the
business of ‘scale-making’, projecting a ‘Zomia’ of past interaction
6 W. van Schendel, ‘Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance: Jumping
Scale in Southeast Asia’Environment and PlanningD: Society and Space 20, 2002, pp. 647–
668. James Scott’s use of van Schendel’s ‘Zomia’ has attained particular prominence
over the past couple of years (see J. C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist
History of Upland Southeast Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2009). In this
article, I will not follow Scott, whose approach is highly specific to Southeast Asia
and focuses on ‘state evasion’, but van Schendel’s conceptualization of ‘Zomia’, which
reaches out into the highlands of Central Asia in the form of the so-called Zomia+
(see J. Michaud, ‘Editorial: Zomia and Beyond’ Journal of Global History 5(2), 2010,
pp.187–214). See alsoMarsden’s ‘MuslimCosmopolitans’, which looks at interactions
between people from Chitral (Pakistan), Afghanistan, and Tajikistan precisely from
this perspective.
7 A. L. Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection, PrincetonUniversity Press,
Princeton and Oxford, 2005, p. 57.
8 See N. Brenner, ‘Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial
Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales’ Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space 16, 1998, pp. 459–481. N. Brenner, ‘The Urban Question as
a Scale Question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of
Scale’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24(2), 2000, pp. 361–378.
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into a desirable future. On the one hand, this emphasizes the need
to engage with the temporal dimensions of such projects, both in the
past and in the future, as ‘cultural facts’ that are of relevance for an
inquiry into the present.9 On the other hand, it also challenges the
usefulness of standard temporal categories and periodizations that
posit an a priori distinction between places on the assumption that
the weights of colonial, socialist, post-colonial, and post-socialist pasts
have inexorably separated them.10
Such reasoning is not only of relevance to the ways we look at
borderlands and the people who inhabit them; it also challenges
assumptions about which places are central and which are marginal
within these spaces and how they are connected to or detached from
the world beyond.11 For instance, in the framework of this article, I
define Karimabad and Khorog as ‘marginal hubs’, thereby indicating
that their status is ambivalent and relational. Thus, the question of
who renders them both central and marginal from different vantage
points and at different points in time lies at the heart of the matter.
Charles Wheeler discusses the oscillation between centrality and
marginality on the example of the interdependency of piracy and
smuggling and the emergence and decline of political formations in
the history of Vietnam.12 In this respect, the ‘marginal centre’ is
9 A. Appadurai, The Future as Cultural Fact: Essays on the Global Condition, Verso,
London and New York, 2013.
10 See D. Owen Hughes, ‘Introduction’ in Time: Histories and Ethnologies, D. Owen
Hughes and T. R. Trautmann (eds.), The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,
1995, pp. 1–18. Owen Hughes advocates a careful and nuanced treatment of
the relationship between historiography and historical time. For studies critically
questioning particular periodizations in Central Asia and Pakistan, see, for example,
J. Beyer, The Force of Custom: Law and Ordering of Everyday Life in Kyrgyzstan, University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2016. D. Ibañez-Tirado, ‘“How Can I Be Post-Soviet if I
Was Never Soviet?”: Rethinking Categories of Time and Social Change, a Perspective
from Kulob, Southern Tajikistan’ Central Asian Survey 34(2), 2015, pp. 190–203.
M. Magnus, ‘Southwest and Central Asia: Comparison, Integration or Beyond?’
in The Sage Handbook of Social Anthropology, Volume I, R. Fardon et al. (eds.), Sage,
London, 2012, pp. 340–365. T. Mostowlansky, ‘Where Empires Meet: Orientalism
and Marginality at the Former Russo-British Frontier’ Etude de lettres 2–3, 2014,
pp. 179–196. M. Reeves, Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia,
CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca,2014.M. Sökefeld, ‘FromColonialism to Postcolonial
Colonialism: Changing Modes of Domination in the Northern Areas of Pakistan’ The
Journal of Asian Studies 64(4), 2005, pp. 939–973.
11 A. Horstmann and R. L. Wadley, ‘Introduction: Centering the Margin in
Southeast Asia’ inCentering theMargin: Agency and Narrative in Southeast Asian Borderlands,
A. Horstmann and R. L. Wadley (eds.), Berghahn, New York, 2006, pp. 1–24.
12 C.Wheeler, ‘Maritime Subversions and Socio-Political Formations inVietnamese
History: A Look from the Marginal Center (mien Trung)’ in New Perspectives on
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not a contradiction, but an acknowledgment of the co-presence of
historical forces that place a locale and its people both in the centre
and at the margins, sometimes on different scales and at different
historical junctures. In this article, I attempt to trace the ephemeral
character of conviviality—the coming and going of a shared life—
across theWakhanandbeyond the arbitrary border separatingCentral
and South Asia and demonstrate that it is marked precisely by such
processes of temporal and spatial transformation.
Such an endeavour requires a careful introduction to both the
silence and the specific instances of conviviality, and the historical
processes that underlie them. Thus, in the following section, I will
introduce Karimabad in Pakistan and Khorog in Tajikistan as part of
an overarching yet fragmented region. In the second part, I will focus
on the defining modes of connectedness and disconnection between
and beyond these places in the past and the present. Finally, in the
third part of the article, I will explore forms of conviviality across the
frontier that are ephemeral,mediated andmarked by specific relations
of power.
Two ‘marginal hubs’ in post-Cold War borderlands
Over the past few years, many of my friends from northern Pakistan
have circulated increasing amounts of information about the region’s
potential for wider connectivity across the borders with Afghanistan
and China. Both the development of the ‘China–Pakistan Economic
Corridor’ (Pakistan Chin iqtesadi rahdari or CPEC) connecting Kashgar
inXinjiang with the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea and intensified
interaction between Pakistan and the republics of Central Asia
have played an influential role. A great deal of the information
on these developments was shared via social media, including on
Facebook and Twitter, and in the shape of links to articles, policy
documents, pictures, and videos in English, Urdu, and local languages
(Burushaski, Shina). Amidst a government-orchestrated campaign
promoting ‘Pakistan–China friendship’ (Pakistan Chin dosti), people of
diverse professional backgrounds, ranging from school teachers, non-
governmental organization (NGO) employees, and officials to local
entrepreneurs, embraced the idea of ‘infrastructure-to-be’ not only
the Historiography of Southeast Asia: Continuing Explorations, M. A. Aung-Thwin and
K. R. Hall (eds.), Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 141–156.
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with hope and desire,13 but also with a sense of nostalgia for the
past.
At the beginning of 2015, some of my friends from Pakistan shared
via Facebook the scanned version of an official letter from the pre-
Internet era. In the 1992 letter, an official from a village in the Ghizer
district of today’s Gilgit-Baltistan administrative territory (previously
the Northern Areas) addresses the then prime minister of Pakistan,
Nawaz Sharif, with a proposal for the construction of a road link
between the town of Gilgit and Tajikistan. The proposal includes a
meticulous assessment of already existing infrastructure and the costs
of building new stretches of road. The official writes in English:
[W]ith the breakdown of communism a new era of renaissance of the Muslim
world has dawned. The Northern Areas of Pakistan is luckily located at
the epicentre of the world populations. It has attained enormous strategic
importance with the creation of new Muslim republics of central Asia. . . .
Development of land route linking Karakorum Highway with Tadzhikistan
as early as possible would be of immense importance and to the advantage
of both the countries for establishing trade. . . . This is a traditional trade
link between Ishkomen in Northern Areas and Pamirs in Afghanistan and
was used by Afghan refugees very conveniently while coming to Gilgit. It is
less mountainous, easy to maintain and being outside monsoon range gets
very little precipitation, therefore, can be kept fit for vehicular traffic during
winter like KKH [Karakoram Highway] at Khunjerab pass.
In the letter, the official from Ghizer designates his region as an
‘epicentre’ in a post-Cold War world in which abandoned forms of
connectivity need to be re-established and revived. Asserting that his
proposed route is the ‘shortest and most economical’, he argues for
reconnection on the basis of economic profit and ‘progress’, which are
strategically organized along the lines of a shared Muslim identity.14
13 P. Harvey and H. Knox, ‘The Enchantments of Infrastructure’ Mobilities 7(4),
2012, pp. 521–536. M. Reeves, ‘Infrastructural Hope: Anticipating “Independent
Roads” andTerritorial Integrity in SouthernKyrgyzstan’Ethnos,82(4),2017, pp.711–
737.
14 Marsden, Trading Worlds, p. xi, points to the salience of Afghanistan and overland
travel in the work of the Indian Muslim philosopher Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal, whose
work still widely reverberates in today’s Pakistan, advances the notion of Muslim
selfhood as mobile, often distinguishing between sea travel as tied to colonialism and
overland routes asmore authentic. In this regard, JavedMajeed also argues that Iqbal,
himself a pivotal figure in Pakistan’s emergence as an Islamic polity, saw migration,
and the journey more generally, as a founding act of the self, paralleling the hijra
from Medina to Mecca. See J. Majeed, ‘Muhammad Iqbal: Islam, Aesthetics and
Postcolonialism’ in Postcolonialism and Islam: Theory, Literature, Culture, Society and Film,
G. Nash, K. Kerr-Koch, and S. E. Hackett (eds.), Routledge, London and New York,
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This two-fold justification for establishing connectivity across ethnic
and sectarian lines still resonates throughout today’s Gilgit-Baltistan.
The fact that the letter dates from two decades ago signifies a lack of
change and emphasizes the persistence of Cold War boundaries that
criss-cross the region. When the official from Ghizer signed and dated
his letter to the prime minister in mid-1992, Tajikistan had already
begun to descend into a period of civil war that lasted until 1997. Since
then, state-to-state interaction between Pakistan and Tajikistan has
been minimal. Today, efforts to physically link the two countries are
often localized and remain part of a discourse on connectivity that is
still to come.15 At the same time, the circulation of the letter, evoking
the image of a united andwell-connectedMuslimworld at large, points
to the desire for a past with a future.16 Against this backdrop, one can
characterize the two places explored in this article—Karimabad in
northern Pakistan and Khorog in eastern Tajikistan—as having been
shaped both by the opening of the region in the course of Chinese
economic globalization and by the afterlives of Cold War discourses
and practices.
Karimabad
Karimabad is located in the Hunza district of Gilgit-Baltistan in the
northernmost part of Pakistan. According toHermannKreutzmann, it
had a population of 5,168 in 1998.17 The settlement, whose old stone
buildings and new concrete houses sprawl over the slopes beneath the
imposing Baltit fort, received its current name in 1983 in honour of
Prince Shah Karim Al Hussaini Aga Khan IV. The Aga Khan IV is the
current Imam of the Nizari Ismailis18 and is revered by a majority of
2015, p. 40, as well as J. Majeed, Muhammad Iqbal: Islam, Aesthetics and Postcolonialism,
Routledge, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 90–115.
15 See, for example, Mostowlansky, ‘Building Bridges’ on Afghanistan and
Tajikistan.
16 Reeves, ‘Infrastructural Hope’, p. 717.
17 H. Kreutzmann, ‘Preservation of Gilgit-Baltistan’s Cultural Heritage as a Key to
Development’ in Preservation of Built Environment and Its Impact on Community Development
in Gilgit-Baltistan, H. Kreutzmann (ed.), Centre for Development Studies, Berlin,
2013, p. 22. The last census dates to 1998 and more recent population figures are
not readily available. However, there is an ongoing 2017 census whose results have
not yet been published at the time of writing.
18 F. Daftary, The Isma’ilis: Their History and Doctrines, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2007. Steinberg, Ismaʼili Modern. S. Mukherjee, Ismailism and Islam in
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the people in Karimabad. The Aga Khan IV is also the chairman of
the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), which has been active
in the greater region for several decades.19
People in Karimabad describe their town as diverse and marked by
plurality and mobility. Most inhabitants of Karimabad are speakers
of Burushaski, but other local languages such as Domaaki, Shina,
and Wakhi are also spoken. Languages commonly used in everyday
encounters with people from outside the region include Urdu and
English. While almost nobody speaks, reads, or writes Persian today,
the language continues to symbolize prestige because of its status
as the language of literature and religion prior to the region’s closer
associationwith the Pakistan nation state. Before the dissolution of the
princely state of Hunza (Kanjut) in 1974, today’s Karimabad served
as the seat of the ruler (mir, tham) of Hunza and thus as a centre of
political power.20 Although the settlement has lost this status, people
in Karimabad still see their town as oscillating between centrality
and marginality, depending on the sphere of influence and point
in time in question. Its location along an ancient trade route21 is
historically evocative and often compared to forms of connectivity
provided through the construction of more recent endeavours such as
the Karakoram Highway.22 Karimabad is also a significant regional
centre for tourism23 and the ‘past in the present’24 is a vital part of
everyday discourse, not least because many people now largely sustain
the present by selling the place’s past to visitors. Neither the past
Modern South Asia: Community and Identity in the Age of Religious Internationals, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2017.
19 T. Mostowlansky, ‘Development Institutions and Religious Networks in the
Pamirian Borderlands’ in Routledge Handbook of Asian Borderlands, A. Horstmann,
M. Saxer, and A. Rippa (eds.), Routledge, London and New York, 2018, pp. 385–
395. D. M. Poor, Authority without Territory: The Aga Khan Development Network and the
Ismaili Imamate, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014. M. Ruthven, ‘The Aga Khan
Development Network and Institutions’ in A Modern History of the Ismailis: Continuity
and Change in a Muslim Community, F. Daftary (ed.), I.B. Tauris, London and New York,
pp. 189–220.
20 Daftary, The Isma’ilis, p. 495.
21 I. Stellrecht, ‘Passage to Hunza: Route Nets and Political Process in a Mountain
State’ in Karakoram in Transition: Culture, Development, and Ecology in the Hunza Valley,
H. Kreutzmann (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 191–216.
22 H. Kreutzmann, ‘The Karakoram Highway: The Impact of Road Construction
on Mountain Societies’Modern Asian Studies 25(4), 1991, pp. 711–736. Rippa, ‘Across
the Khunjerab Pass’.
23 Kreutzmann, ‘Preservation of Gilgit-Baltistan’, p. 14.
24 M. Bloch, ‘The Past and the Present in the Present’ Man 12(2), 1997, pp. 278–
292.
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nor the present is thought of as simply linear or homogenous. For
instance, Sherullah, a man in his fifties whom I befriended in 2013,
has repeatedly told me that people in Karimabad lived in ‘medieval’
conditions of dirt, disease, and immobility before the construction of
the Karakoram Highway in the 1970s. However, others contradicted
this view and commented positively on the settlement’s deeper past
as the centre of the historical state of Hunza and a trading post along
the Silk Road.
This ‘charging’ of the past with the present and vice versa25 ties in
with political and developmental discourses of marginality to which
Karimabad has been subject, both as a place at the periphery of
the British empire and independent Pakistan26 and because of its
location on a former Cold War boundary. In everyday life, the effects
of these discourses materialize in a felt distance from urban centres
in the lowland, a sense of geographical remoteness,27 repeated road
construction and development initiatives from the 1970s onwards,28
and a more recent decrease in international visitors due to post-9/11
developments in Pakistan.29 At the same time, these discourses are
juxtaposed with an image of Karimabad as a meeting place for people
of diverse backgrounds, a centre of learning with numerous schools,
and a settlement along the major artery connecting Pakistan and
China.
Khorog
The town of Khorog is part of eastern Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region and lies some 300 kilometres (linear distance)
north-west of Karimabad. The two places are separated by high-
altitude terrain, two international borders (Pakistan–Afghanistan and
Afghanistan–Tajikistan) and the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan.
Like Karimabad, Khorog is a diverse and multilingual place, with
a range of Pamir languages, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Russian being spoken
25 N. D.Munn, ‘The Cultural Anthropology of Time: A Critical Essay’Annual Review
of Anthropology 21, 1992, p. 114.
26 Sökefeld, ‘From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism’.
27 S. Hussain, Remoteness and Modernity: Transformation and Continuity in Northern
Pakistan, Yale University Press, NewHaven and London, 2015. Mostowlansky, ‘Where
Empires Meet’.
28 H. Kreutzmann, Hunza: Ländliche Entwicklung im Karakoram, Dietrich Reimer
Verlag, Berlin, 1989.
29 Kreutzmann, ‘Preservation of Gilgit-Baltistan’, p. 14.
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in everyday life. Khorog, now with a population of around 30,000,
developed from a village into a larger settlement when Russian
colonial forces arrived at the end of the nineteenth century and built
a military garrison there (post Khorogskii).30
In this sense, Khorog has functioned as a hub throughout the
twentieth century and up to the present day. The very foundation
of the settlement is rooted in imperial encounters that pulled its
inhabitants into the orbit of Russian influence. As AlexanderMorrison
argues, the link between Russia and the Pamirs not only reflected
geostrategic interests in the region that resulted from territorial
competition with the British empire located to the south; it was
also founded on a purported racial affinity marked by common
Aryan descent.31 During Khorog’s transformation into a Soviet
administrative centre and bustling town on the Pamir Highway,32
the idea of a special cultural and aesthetic connection between Russia
and the Pamirs persisted and was, as I will discuss later, amplified
by Soviet ‘provisioning’ and the introduction of Soviet modernity.
Post-Cold War development33—often fostered by the Aga Khan
Development Network—and border openings with Afghanistan34
and China35 have resulted in the revival of old connections and
the establishment of new networks beyond Khorog. Many of my
interlocutors in the town have discussed these events—linked to
processes of ethnicity, religious reform, and economic change—as
situated against the backdrop of the fundamentally transformative
Soviet experience. Nevertheless, like Karimabad, Khorog has often
been labelled, somewhat paradoxically, as both marginal and central
30 F. Bliss, Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs (Gorno-Badakhshan, Tajikistan),
Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 73. M. A. Bubnova, Istoriia Gorno-
Badakhshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti: S drevneishikh vremen do noveishego perioda, Vol. I, Paivand,
Dushanbe, 2005, p. 369. A. Morrison, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in
Imperial Expansion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, forthcoming.
31 Morrison, The Russian Conquest.
32 T. Mostowlansky, Azan on the Moon: Entangling Modernity along Tajikistan’s Pamir
Highway, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2017. N. A., 70-sol shahri Khorugh,
Dushanbe, Ma’rifat, 2002.
33 Bliss, Social and Economic Change, pp. 297–343.
34 Mostowlansky, ‘Building Bridges’. Remtilla, ‘Re-Producing Social Relations’.
35 T. Kraudzun, ‘From the Pamir Frontier to International Borders: Exchange
Relations of the Borderland Population’ in Subverting Borders: Doing Research on
Smuggling and Small-Scale Trade, B. Bruns and J. Miggelbrink (eds.), VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2011, pp. 171–191. T. Mostowlansky, ‘The Road
Not Taken: Enabling and Limiting Mobility in the Eastern Pamirs’ Internationales
Asienforum/International Quarterly for Asian Studies 45(1–2), 2014, pp. 153–170.
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in political and developmental discourses: it has featured as an outpost
on the periphery of the Russian Empire, a dead-end town along the
once heavily militarized Soviet–Afghan border, and a mountainous
way station along the contemporary trade route connecting Urumqi
and Kashgar in China with Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe, but also as
a regional centre of political power, a place of strategic importance,
a site of continuous infrastructural investment, and a town with two
universities.
For the people of Khorog whom I have encountered since 2008,
the co-presence of centrality and marginality is an intrinsic and
normalized part of their daily lives. While the fact that both Khorog
andKarimabad are predominantly inhabited by Ismailismight provide
themost obvious link between the two places, their status as ‘marginal
hubs’ in geographical proximity yet fundamentally different historical
and political contexts constitutes an equally salient connection. In the
following section, I situate the two places and their people amidst
processes that have contributed to an ambivalent sense of a shared,
yet divided, history. I argue that these parallel modes of connection
and detachment have emerged during imperial endeavours, the
construction of a Cold War frontier, and specific forms of post-Cold
War globalization.
Modes of connectedness and disconnection
Looking back in history, there is a range of different ‘scale-making
projects’ that inform the ways people in Karimabad and Khorog
situate themselves in space and time. I borrow the term ‘scale-making
projects’ from Anna Tsing, who uses it to refer to forms of ‘spatial
dimensionality’ that provide the foundation for particular takes on
the world, ranging from ‘microscopic’ to ‘planetary’.36 Examples of
people’s participation in such scale-making projects include everyday
practices such as school children singing the national anthems
of Tajikistan and Pakistan, nostalgia for and visions of a united
frontier zone, debates at a wedding in Hunza on the Balawaristan
nationalist movement seeking independence for Gilgit-Baltistan,37
similar discussions in Khorog’s city park on the distinction between
36 Tsing, Friction, p. 58.
37 M. Sökefeld, ‘Ba¯la¯warista¯n and Other Imaginations: A Nationalist Discourse
in the Northern Areas of Pakistan’ in Ladakh: Culture, History and Development between
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Pamiris and Tajiks, and road construction workers telling me that
the difference between a Shughni speaker in Khorog and one on
the Afghan side just across the river is ‘socialism’. They also include
reverence and respect for the ‘royal’ family in Hunza and Khorogis
expressing feelings of superiority towards Bartangis from a nearby
mountain valley. And they materialize in people’s active involvement
in events and institutions of the global Ismaili Jamat (‘community’),
which is evoked in prayers, development initiatives, shared religious
rituals, and student exchange programmes.
Amidst thiswealth of references to imperial, national, transnational,
and local scale-making projects, connectivity between Karimabad and
Khorog is diffuse, flickering here and there in everyday conversations
and institutional settings, and currently centrally organized around
the figure of the Aga Khan IV as a ‘social, political, and spiritual
leader’.38 As I argue below, the oscillating quality of connectivity and
disconnectedness between the two places cannot be naturalized solely
on the basis of different imperial and national contexts; it is also rooted
in their respective local histories.
Imperial ties and Cold War division
A take on pre-imperial history that is popular among people in Khorog
goes as follows. Before the Russians arrived in the region, Shughnan,
the area in which today’s Khorog is situated, used to be a crossroads
for trade and was linked to the mountain valleys of northern Pakistan.
However, the inhabitants of Shughnan also suffered frequent attacks
by ‘Afghans’ (Afghonho),39 and eventually their leaders sent a petition
to the Russian tsar, who offered protection and integrated the region
into the Russian empire.
This particular view of Badakhshani history, which sees Russian
expansion as a benign process of ‘joining together’ (prisoedinenie),
Himalaya andKarakoram,M. vanBeek,K. Brix Bertelsen, and P. Pedersen (eds.), Aarhus
University Press, Aarhus, 1999, pp. 350–368.
38 Steinberg, Ismaʼili Modern, p. 10.
39 The use of the term afghon in Khorog is ambiguous. It refers to citizens of
Afghanistanmore generally, includingPamir language-speakers just across the border
river, but can also be used more specifically to denote people coming from other parts
of Afghanistan to Shughnan (including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and so on). In the
historical narrative discussed here, the latter is the case—that is, it evokes the notion
of outsiders invading the region.
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reverberates in local legends and stories.40 Soviet and post-Soviet
historiography has reinforced this interpretation by emphasizing the
role of the petition to the Russians,41 ultimately popularizing it as
a symbol of Pamiri–Russian friendship that surfaces in schoolbooks,
media discourse, andmundane conversations.Moreover, the narrative
of a special and benevolent relationship between Russians and
the inhabitants of Gorno-Badakhshan is an important element in
understanding the changing modes of connectedness in the region
under colonial and socialist conditions. The establishment of a Russian
protectorate at the Tajik–Afghan border at the end of the nineteenth
century directly fed into the process of introducing Soviet power
and securing a loyal Cold War borderland by offering alternative
economic, cultural, and aesthetic forms of connectivity.42 From the
1930s onwards, the Soviets militarized Gorno-Badakhshan’s borders
with Afghanistan and China in an attempt to re-route people in
Khorog towards a new and distinct historical trajectory.43
In the case of Karimabad, imperial ties took a rather different shape
and resulted in narratives that reflect changing forms of domination
from the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth
century. The re-establishment of the British Gilgit Agency in 1889
is important in this regard,44 as is the British conquest of Hunza
in 1892.45 The Gilgit Agency in particular can be seen as a British
reaction to Russian expansion in Central Asia and thus as part of
broader geopolitical developments.46 Despite British intervention,
Hunza remained a separate political entity, with the mir of Hunza
40 D. Beben, ‘Local Narratives of the Great Game in Badakhshan’, unpublished
manuscript. Morrison, The Russian Conquest.
41 Beben, ‘Local Narratives’. Bubnova, IstoriiaGorno-Badakhshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti,
p. 356.
42 B. Kassymbekova, Despite Cultures: Early Soviet Rule in Tajikistan, University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2016. M. Saxer, ‘A Spectacle of Maps: Cartographic
Hope and Anxieties in the Pamirs’ Cross-Currents 21, 2016, pp. 111–136.
43 P. Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic, I.B.
Tauris, London, 2007, p. 99. Kraudzun, ‘From the Pamir Frontier to International
Borders’. D. Straub, ‘The Ismailis and Kirghiz of the Upper Amu Darya and Pamirs
in Afghanistan: A Micro-History of Delineating International Borders’, MA thesis,
Indiana University, 2013.
44 Sökefeld, ‘From Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism’, p. 944.
45 A. H. Dani,History of Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and
Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, p. 273.
46 Dani, History of Northern Areas, p. 283. R. Huttenback, ‘The Great Game in the
Pamirs and Hindukush: The British Conquest of Hunza and Nagar’ Modern Asian
Studies 9(1), 1975, pp. 1–29.
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continuing to reside in the fort at Baltit above today’s Karimabad.
This was the case until 1974, when Pakistan’s president Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto dissolved the princely state and annexed it to the Northern
Areas, which were under the control of the federal government.
Before the dissolution of the princely state of Hunza, another
geopolitical process held the region in its sway. The decolonization and
partition of British India in 1947 put northern Pakistan at the heart of
the conflict between India and Pakistan over control of Kashmir. This
‘struggle for freedom’ (jang azadi) against the Maharaja of Kashmir
and Indian troops has resulted in very different historical narratives,
ranging from nationalist depictions of a united struggle to more
localized impressions that the event simply represented a transition
from British to Pakistani colonial domination.47 These issues have
not lost their general importance for the people of Karimabad and
Gilgit-Baltistan. Even though their major point of orientation with
regard to opportunities for education and work is lowland Pakistan,
including Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad, the unresolved status
of the Kashmir conflict and Gilgit-Baltistan’s resulting lack of full
constitutional recognition have led to ambivalent attitudes towards
the nation state.48
Karimabad and Khorog are both located in borderlands that have
had complex, if not uneasy, relations with their superordinate political
entities and centres of political power in the course of the twentieth
and the early twenty-first centuries. Gorno-Badakhshan, for instance,
went through a history of Russian colonial domination, processes
of massive social transformation as part of the Soviet Union, and,
in the post-Soviet period, the Tajik civil war, with its still palpable
effects. As for Gilgit-Baltistan, it has experienced a long period of
outside domination—first in the British colonial framework and then
within the context of the Pakistani nation state—that is perceived
as having led to a lack of self-determination and local agency. In both
47 M. Sökefeld, ‘Jang Azadi: Perspectives on a Major Theme in Northern Areas
History’ in The Past in the Present: Horizons of Remembering in the Pakistan Himalaya,
I. Stellrecht (ed.), Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, Köln, 1997, pp. 61–81. Sökefeld, ‘From
Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism’.
48 N. K. Ali, ‘States of Struggle: Politics, Religion, and Ecology in the Making of the
Northern Areas, Pakistan’, PhD diss., Cornell University, 2009. N. Ali, ‘Poetry, Power,
Protest: Reimagining Muslim Nationhood in Northern Pakistan’ Comparative Studies of
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 32(1), 2012, pp. 13–24. C. Haines,Nation, Territory
and Globalization in Pakistan: Traversing the Margins, Routledge, London, 2012. Hussain,
Remoteness and Modernity.
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places, these processes of transformation have gone hand in hand with
particular projects of modernization and societal development that I
summarize under the rubric of ‘development work’. In the following, I
seek to show that this ‘development work’ has had paradoxical impacts
on people’s lives in Karimabad and Khorog: while it is intended to
introduce ‘progress’ to the area, it has also often highlighted the
region’s marginality and disconnection.
Development work
Soviet efforts to reconfigure the border area adjacent to Afghanistan
and China were marked by the establishment of distinction. Starting
in the 1930s, the separation between ‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist’ realms
was tied to ideological and economic considerations.49 Yet it also
materialized as border infrastructure as well as general social and
infrastructural development in Gorno-Badakhshan. This included the
construction of new roads, hospitals, and schools, the promotion of
gender equality, access to privileged provisioning of basic goods,
educational opportunities, and mobility within the Soviet Union.50
In Khorog, and Gorno-Badakhshan more generally, people refer to
this process as ‘Moscow provisioning’ (Moskovskoe obespechenie), which
denotes Soviet attempts to create ‘centres’ in selected places all over
the Union.51
As a centre in the periphery, Khorog and other places in Gorno-
Badakhshan were marked by distinction from their surroundings
within the Soviet Union. Moreover, Khorog’s location at the
Afghan border also turned the place into a symbol of progress
in contradistinction to the ‘undeveloped’ Afghan side across the
river. In 2013, Shirinbek, an elderly man with whom I discussed
Soviet development in Khorog, characterized the Soviet distinction
between the two different realms along the Afghan border as
one ‘between Soviet people who became modern (sovremennye)
49 C. Shaw, ‘Friendship Under Lock and Key: The Soviet Central Asian Border,
1918–34’ Central Asian Survey 30(3–4), 2011, pp. 331–348.
50 Bliss, Social and Economic Change. T. Kraudzun, ‘External Support and Local
Agency: Uncertain Transformations of Livelihoods in the Pamirian Borderland of
Tajikistan’ inMappingTransition in the Pamirs: ChangingHuman-Environmental Landscapes,
H. Kreutzmann and T. Watanabe (eds.), Springer, Dordrecht, 2016, pp. 159–179.
Mostowlansky, Azan on the Moon. Remtilla, ‘Re-Producing Social Relations’.
51 Reeves, Border Work, p. 114.
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and uncivilized (netsivilizovannye) people in Afghanistan, India and
Pakistan’. Shirinbek’s statement does not mean that the countries
mentioned were not sites of development for national or international
actors. In fact, Afghanistan itself was an important site for Soviet
development initiatives52 and, as I will discuss below, northern
Pakistan was subject to its own distinctive path of development
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. However, we
can understand Shirinbek’s sentiment, which is widely shared by
members of his generation, as based on the observation that there
was an obvious difference between the Tajik and the Afghan sides of
the river that was indexed through dichotomies such as roads versus
paths, electricity versus candles, and concrete houses versusmud-brick
huts. The establishment of distinction in this ‘previously borderless’
(sarhad nabud) region also signified anew formof connectivity rendering
Moscow closer than Kabul and southern Kyrgyzstan closer than
northern Pakistan. In our conversation, Shirinbek described this
connectivity as an embodied cultural closeness that led to Khorogis
looking and behaving ‘like Russians’ (rangi rusho)—a process that he
identified with Pamiris starting to wear clothes from Moscow, speak
Russian fluently, and drink vodka.
Development in Karimabad, and in other parts of today’s Gilgit-
Baltistan, has a different genealogy and is closely linked to the
establishment of Ismaili institutions in the region. In this regard, the
account of Ismaili activist and local historian Qudratullah Haji Beg
provides detailed insights into interactions between the Aga Khan
III in Bombay and his supporters in the Central Asian borderlands
that led to the construction of community centres and educational
institutions.53 Beg describes negotiations, fundraising, construction,
and political intrigues between the 1930s and the 1950s, situating
them within a political environment in which local people—even
across colonial and then Cold War boundaries—were considered
part of a ‘Central Asian Ismaili community’ (Sentral eshyaki jama’at).
Border closures and the decreasing connectivity between the different
borderlands further directed people’s orientation in Karimabad and
other places on the British side of the frontier towards Bombay and,
52 P. Robinson and J. Dixon, Aiding Afghanistan: A History of Soviet Assistance
to a Developing Country, Columbia University Press, New York, 2013. T. Nunan,
Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in ColdWar Afghanistan, CambridgeUniversity
Press, Cambridge, 2016.
53 Q. H. Beg, Tarikh-e tamir-e Sentral Jama’atkhana-ye Gilgit (The Construction of the
Central Jama’atkhana of Gilgit), no publisher, Baltit, 1967.
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after partition, towards Karachi. In this respect, the infrastructures
of the British empire and independent Pakistan played a decisive
role, as did linguistic preferences, which began to turn to English
and Urdu and away from Persian, which had previously served as the
lingua franca in the region. For instance, in 1940, Sultan Muhammad
Shah Aga Khan III addressed his ‘spiritual children’ in ‘the Northern
Frontiers of India, such as Chitral, Hunza, Gilgit and Badakhshan’
via Delhi Radio and called on them to educate the youth and ‘to
learn European languages and the English language’.54 Since there
were only a few hundred literate people in the whole of Hunza,
broader access to education first had to be provided. Soon, Aga
Khan institutions had constructed 18 schools in Hunza, followed
by another 60 comparable schools by 1973.55 The establishment of
schools and, therefore, access to education have been part of broader
processes of development in Hunza in general and in Karimabad in
particular. From the 1970s onwards, large-scale road construction
made travel to and from Hunza much faster and easier. The
construction of the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan and
China is of particular importance in this respect. In 1982, the road
was declared open for regular traffic between Pakistan and China,56
thus providing the inhabitants of Karimabad with road access to
both the Pakistani lowlands and Kashgar in nearby Xinjiang. Larger-
scale development projects followed the newly established transport
network57 and, in 1982, the Aga Khan Foundation, part of the Aga
Khan Development Network (AKDN), established the Aga Khan
Rural Support Programme.58 Today, in the broader framework of
northern Pakistan, the AKDN constitutes only one of many different
institutions active in the development sector. However, in Karimabad
and Hunza more generally, AKDN agencies are the principal actors in
54 F. M. Hunzai, ‘A Living Branch of Islam: Ismailis of the Mountains of Hunza’
Oriente Moderno 84, 2004, p. 157.
55 Kreutzmann,Hunza, pp. 162–163. On the history of education in Hunza, see also
A. Benz, ‘Education and Development in the Karakorum: Educational Expansion and
Its Impact in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan’ Erdkunde 67(2), 2013, pp. 123–136.
56 Kreutzmann, Hunza, p. 35.
57 H. Kreutzmann, ‘The Karakoram Highway as a Prime Exchange Corridor
Between Pakistan and China’ in Proceedings of the Regional Workshop Integrated Tourism
Concepts to Contribute to Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions Gilgit/Pakistan—
Kashgar/P.R.China, Oct 8–14, 2008, H. Kreutzmann, G. A. Beg, L. Zhaohui, and
J. Richter (eds.), InWEnt, Bonn, 2009, p. 25.
58 G. Wood, A. Malik, and S. Sagheer (eds.), Valleys in Transition: Twenty Years of
AKRSP’s Experience in Northern Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
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social and infrastructural development. It is this trajectory of outside
influence that people in Karimabad are referring to when they speak
of a transition from ‘medieval’ to ‘modern’ times, drawing a distinction
between educated Hunza and other ‘illiterate’ regions of Pakistan.59
The distinction between centres of learning at the margins,
exemplified by Karimabad and Khorog, and lesser-educated lowlands
reverses Ernest Gellner’s take on Muslim societies in which learning
is associated with urban centres where political power and trade
are concentrated.60 Working against such a binary, the effects of
‘development’ in the two places in the course of the twentieth century
suggest that we can observe both constructions and deconstructions
of marginality, rendering Karimabad and Khorog simultaneously
marginal and central.61 This is illustrated by colonial, socialist, and
post-colonial boundary-making projects and subsequent approaches
to modernization. In the post-Cold War period, these efforts have
been merged in an envisioned micro-regional integration of places in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. This process has been centred
on the figure of the Aga Khan IV, who communicates and puts
into practice—via public speeches, ‘edicts’ (farman), and development
projects—his vision for the reintegration of Ismaili populations once
separated by ideological frontiers.
Post-Cold War humanitarianism
In Tajikistan, the end of the Cold War in 1991marked the beginning
of the Tajik civil war, which ravaged the country from 1992 to 1997.62
This event influenced recent processes of transformation in Gorno-
Badakhshan because it attracted an influx of outside actors to the
region to help deal with the humanitarian crises that accompanied
the civil war. In the winter of 1992–93, approximately 180,000
inhabitants of Gorno-Badakhshan and several tens of thousands of
59 T. Mostowlansky, ‘Humanitarianism across Mountain Valleys: “Shia Aid” and
Development Encounters in Northern Pakistan and Eastern Tajikistan’ in Mapping
Transition in the Pamirs: Changing Human-Environmental Landscapes, H. Kreutzmann and
T. Watanabe (eds.), Springer, Dordrecht, 2016, pp. 229–244.
60 E. Gellner, Saints of the Atlas, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969.
61 See also S. F. Green, Notes from the Balkans: Locating Marginality and Ambiguity on the
Greek-Albanian Border, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005.
62 K. Nourzhanov and C. Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Social and Political History, ANU E
Press, Canberra, 2013, pp. 323–335.
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refugees, many of them in Khorog, were cut off from other parts of
Tajikistan.63 In addition, refugees fromTajikistanwent toAfghanistan
and other Central Asian republics,64 as well as to Chitral in Pakistan
(although there are no reports of Tajiks in Hunza).65
Facing starvation after the Soviet system of provisioning had
collapsed in Gorno-Badakhshan, people in Khorog and other places
became dependent on alternate lines of support from the outside.66
The first and most important actor that entered the region at that
stage was the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), which related to the
Pamirs not only on the basis of the above-mentioned religious-
historical ties, but also against the backdrop of several decades of
development work in the immediate vicinity. As oral and written
reports of the AKF’s early take on Khorog and Gorno-Badakhshan
in 1993 show, the foundation’s long-standing experience in northern
Pakistan initially informed perceptions of the broader region
(includingGorno-Badakhshan andGilgit-Baltistan) as ‘culturally’ and
‘topographically’ uniform. However, it soon became clear that 70
years of Soviet modernization had significantly shaped not only the
region’s infrastructure, but also its social organization and people’s
expectations regarding living standards and mobility.67
The recognition of difference between the region’s various
communities in the aftermath of the Cold War has, on the one hand,
led to the adaptation of development templates and approaches. On
the other hand, it has also contributed to the launching of projects
that aim to transcend difference by establishing contact, for instance
by building bridges and cross-border markets as well as by fostering
professional development, trade, and educational mobility.68 The Aga
63 Bliss, Social and Economic Change, p. 4.
64 Human Rights Watch, ‘Tajik Refugees in Northern Afghanistan: Obstacles
to Repatriation’, Hrw.org, online: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Tajik.htm
(accessed 12May 2017).
65 M. Marsden, Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan’s North-West
Frontier, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 40. Marsden and Hopkins,
Fragments of the Afghan Frontier, p. 153, note that Pamiris coming to Chitral were not
simply displaced persons, but were already connected to the place’s culture and history
by virtue of their family histories and Ismaili identities.
66 S. Keshavjee, ‘Medicines and Transitions: The Political Economy of Health and
Social Change in Post-Soviet Badakhshan, Tajikistan’, PhD diss., Harvard University,
1998. S. Keshavjee, Blind Spot: How Neoliberalism Infiltrated Global Health, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 2014.
67 Bliss, Social and Economic Change, p. 4.
68 B. Bolander, ‘English, Motility and Ismaili Transnationalism’ International Journal
of the Sociology of Language 247, 2017. C. Maertens, ‘No Debt, No Business:
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Khan IV and the institutions he chairs are critical actors in this
endeavour to create a common future, not only with respect to visions
of development, but also in terms of the standardization of religious
practice, teachings, and leadership.69 However, as Magnus Marsden
and Benjamin Hopkins argue, these attempts at homogenization have
not necessarily supplanted or even weakened local Ismaili identities
in the region.70 Indeed, ‘borderland dwellers’ often contrast their
local practices to those of Ismailis in other parts of the world, and
particularly to those of the diasporic Khoja Ismailis,71 who hold
powerful positions in the Aga Khan institutions and are physically
present as administrators and volunteers.72 Thus, Ismaili development
efforts and the vision of a global Ismaili community have had complex
and ambivalent effects on Karimabad and Khorog. While fostering an
Ismaili identity envisaged as detached from locality, they have in fact
provided the ground for establishing contact across the frontier that
ties in with the remembrance of a common local past.
Conviviality across the divide
As I have attempted to show in the previous two sections, links
between Karimabad and Khorog are not straightforward: they are
ephemeral and oftenmarked by silence. They also lack a direct form of
connectivity such as exists between, for instance, Gorno-Badakhshan
and Chitral, which is marked by physical movement between the
two places and facilitated by a common and active belonging to the
The Personalisation of Market Exchange in Gorno-Badakhshan, Tajikistan’ in
Approaching Ritual Economy: Socio-Cosmic Fields in Globalized Contexts, R. Hardenberg
(ed.), RessourcenKulturen, Tübingen, 2017, pp. 159–192. Mostowlansky, ‘Building
Bridges’.
69 On the processes of universalization that are involved in this regard, see S.
Mukherjee, ‘Universalising Aspirations: Community and Social Service in the Isma’ili
Imagination in Twentieth-Century South Asia and East Africa’ in The Shi’a in Modern
South Asia: Religion, History and Politics, J. Jones and A. U. Qasmi (eds.), Cambridge
University Press, Delhi, 2015, pp. 105–130.
70 Marsden and Hopkins, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier, p. 151.
71 I. S. Akhtar, ‘Religious Citizenship: The Case of the Globalised Khojas’ African
Sociological Review 18(01), 2014, pp. 27–48. A. Nanji, ‘Khojas’ in Encyclopedia of Islam
and the Muslim World, Volume I, R. C. Martin (ed.), Macmillan, New York, 2004,
p. 393.
72 For a critique of unequal power relations in this constellation, see F. Devji,
‘Preface’ inThe Ismailis in the Colonial Era:Modernity, Empire and Islam, M. vanGrondelle,
Hurst & Company, London, 2009, pp. ix–xvi.
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Persianate sphere,73 or among the Wakhi of Afghanistan, China,
Pakistan, and Tajikistan, who interact on the basis of shared language
and ethnicity.74 Nevertheless, people in Karimabad and Khorog
talk about each other, project a common past into the future, and
occasionally meet, virtually and physically, in settings that are ordered
along regimes of class, privilege, andmerit. The concept of conviviality
poses a challenge to theorizing this kind of connectivity if it remains,
as noted above, conceptually tied to face-to-face encounters in urban
spaces. For this reason, I want to decouple the concept from its
usual context of urban proximity and density in order to expand its
applicability. In the place of shared everyday lives, what links the
people of Karimabad and Khorog is nostalgia for a past that engages
with the present and the future.75 And, rather than co-residence, co-
existence, and shared physical space, there is a distance that highlights
the institutional, political, and social rules and norms that underlie an
ephemeral and occasionally activatable conviviality.76 In the following,
I discuss such instances of conviviality betweenKarimabad andKhorog
along three main lines of enquiry: first, I look at common geography
as a source of intimacy; second, I show how people in Karimabad and
Khorog refer to shared ethics as a binding factor; and, finally, I turn
to mobility beyond the two places and the role of media technology in
negotiating translocal forms of identity.
Common geography, dissected modernity
Ona summer evening in 2011, I sat withMamadnazar andKhilvatsho,
two Pamiri men in their thirties or forties, in a garden in Khorog.
We watched videos featuring speeches of the Aga Khan and, when
an image of the Hunza Valley with the Baltit fort above Karimabad
briefly appeared on the TV screen, Mamadnazar said: ‘I knew there
were brothers and sisters over there, but we have rarely seen them. I
think we should go there, but it’s hard when there’s no connection.’
Then Khilvatsho added: ‘They helped us in 1992 . . . in 1993.’ And
73 Marsden and Hopkins, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier, p. 152.
74 Kreutzmann, Pamirian Crossroads.
75 M. Pickering and E. Keightley, ‘The Modalities of Nostalgia’ Current Sociology
54(6), 2006, pp. 919–941.
76 Freitag, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Conviviality’, p. 376.
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Mamadnazar continued: ‘And they still help us today so that we live
better—not rich, but average.’
Mamadnazar and Khilvatsho are cousins and grew up in Khorog.
Now they spend most of their lives apart and travel between
Khorog, Murghab in the eastern Pamirs, the Tajik capital Dushanbe,
Kumsangir in south-western Tajikistan, and Moscow for work and
family visits. Both thus orient towards a geographical framework that
the Tajik nation state and Moscow as a centre of economic potential
have laid out. Against this backdrop, the discussion that emerged on
that evening in 2011 highlighted the faraway–nearby ambivalence
that people in Karimabad and Khorog often referred to when talking
about each other.
Their discussion departed from the brief images of northern
Pakistan on TV and quickly turned to the importance of historical
developments. Khilvatsho recalled: ‘Before the Soviet Union, the road
was open, and then they used the river as a border, set up barbed wire,
and relatives stayed on different sides of the border.’ Mamadnazar
added, referring to pan-Soviet education: ‘After that, we all had a very
strict upbringing [vospitanie] in the trade union [profsoiuz]; with unity
and brotherhood, almost like in the Qur’an, being brothers despite
difference in ethnicity [national’nost’] and religion [religiia].’
Mamadnazar’s take onwhat wemight call ‘Soviet conviviality’ points
to the analytical limitations of conviviality when viewed from post-
multicultural settings in ‘the West’, which are often seen as in need
of a revised liberalism.77 In her study of youth and state-making in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azra Hromadžic´, drawing on Michael Herzfeld’s
notion of nostalgia as ‘edenic order’,78 argues that conventional
ideas associated with multiculturalism such as tolerance and open-
mindedness might have little relevance beyond these particular
settings.79 Indeed, Mamadnazar’s nostalgia for brotherhood and unity
referred to a ‘Soviet conviviality’ marked by political intervention and
boundary-making. If we apply this observation to Khorog, we see that,
while cutting the place off from neighbouring areas in Afghanistan—a
process people referred to as establishing ‘difference’ or ‘distinction’
(Tajik farq, Russian raznitsia)—the Soviet Union also brought with it
77 Gilroy, After Empire.
78 M. Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State, Routledge, New
York, 2005.
79 A. Hromadžic´, Citizens of an Empty Nation: Youth and State-Making in Postwar Bosnia
Herzegovina, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2015, p. 142.
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new forms of living together that were state-enforced, regimented,
and connected to a strict, rather illiberal upbringing, but which are
now often fondly remembered.
People in northern Pakistan likewise recognize this distinction as a
cultural and material fact. For instance, Niaz, a man in his fifties
from Karimabad, travelled several times overland from northern
Pakistan to Khorog while working in gem-sector development for a
NGOwith offices in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the United
States. When we met in autumn 2013, he told me that such overland
trips were not possible anymore because of the worsening security
situation in Afghan Badakhshan, but he recalled vivid memories of
his previous trips. He explained how he had travelled from Gilgit to
Chitral, where he crossed the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, and then
continued onwards to Ishkoshim and Khorog in Tajikistan. ‘On these
journeys,’ Niaz said, ‘I saw that we’re different even though we have
the same traditions.’ Then he continued: ‘Even though you’re so close,
you travel across a continent. You start here in Pakistan, you cross
Afghanistan where they put their women on donkeys to travel, and
then you step over the next border and see mini-skirts and European
houses in Khorog.’
In his description, Niaz attributed an alternate form of modernity
to Khorog that he, with a mixed sense of fascination and disapproval,
reproached for having become Europeanized and distant. This take
on regional geography is not uncommon in Karimabad, where people
imagineBadakhshan in both neighbouringAfghanistan andTajikistan
as close because of their shared history and cultural similarities,80 yet
distinct due to different forms of economic and political development.
In this respect, it is important to note that, while my interlocutors
in Khorog often defined people in Afghanistan and Pakistan as less
modern, at least from their own reference point in Soviet history, my
interlocutors in Karimabad perceived themselves as having received
development in the course of the construction of the Karakoram
Highway and the Aga Khan-funded development projects. The fact
that Gorno-Badakhshan went through Soviet modernization from the
1930s onwards, yet was in need of existential support from ‘brothers
and sisters’ in Pakistan in the1990s (as expressed byMamadnazar and
Khilvatsho), highlights the pronounced non-linearity of modernity as
80 Ali, ‘States of Struggle’, p. 79.
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a ‘time orientation’.81 Concurrently, different degrees of development
also dissected the common geography that people in both places
invoked when they referred to shared mountain ranges, similar
traditions, and historical interactions.
Shared ethics
On the one hand, the narratives of commonality across modern
frontiers that people express in Karimabad and Khorog refer to
geography and comparable lifestyles, ultimately deriving from their
cohabitation within the same environment. On the other hand, they
also highlight the role of shared ethics that many of my interlocutors
attributed to the region’s broader history. In the remembrance of
how these shared ethics emerged, the figure of Nasir-i Khusraw plays
a pivotal role. In many places across Gorno-Badakhshan, Afghan
Badakhshan, northern Pakistan, and adjacent parts of China, Nasir-
i Khusraw is considered the missionary (da’i) and philosopher who
brought Ismailism to the region in the eleventh century. Born in Balkh
in present-day Afghanistan, Khusraw travelled extensively throughout
Central Asia and the Middle East, ultimately reaching the Fatimid
court in Cairo, where he engaged with Ismailism. Upon his return to
Balkh as an Ismaili missionary, he was forced to flee and seek refuge
in Yumgan in today’s Afghan Badakhshan.82
The adoption of Khusraw’s work has taken various shapes over
time and space, and has fed into identity politics in interesting ways.
For instance, as a prominent figure in the project of Tajik nation
building,Nasir-iKhusrawprovides Ismailis inGorno-Badakhshanwith
a ‘critical meeting point’ with ‘espousers of Tajik national identity’.83
He has, moreover, become part of the global Ismaili discourse.84 While
historical research shows that the trajectories of conversion and the
relevance of Nasir-i Khusraw’s influence in the greater region are
81 G. Therborn, ‘EntangledModernities’ European Journal of Social Theory 6(3), 2003,
pp. 293–305.
82 A. C. Hunsberger, Nasir Khusraw: The Ruby of Badakhshan, A Portrait of the Persian
Poet, Traveller and Philosopher, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2003.
83 D. Beben, ‘The Legendary Biographies of Nasir-i Khusraw: Memory and
Texualization in Early Modern Persian Isma’ilism’, PhD diss., Indiana University,
2015, p. 434.
84 Steinberg, Ismaʼili Modern, p. 91.
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uneven, non-linear, and highly diversified at the local level,85 his
personage nevertheless constitutes an overarching umbrella under
which various ideas and practices attain a shared status.
When I first interacted with people in Hunza in 2012, they
frequently asked me about my personal background, my knowledge
of languages, and the places I had visited in the region. Whenever I
mentioned Persian and that I had been to Tajikistan, they responded
that Persian had a very high standing in Hunza, first because Persian
used to be the language of the educated (prior to firmer integration
into the Pakistan nation state) and second because it was the tongue
in which Nasir-i Khusraw (Pir Shah Nasir) and the pirs, the religious
specialists who followed him,86 spread their teachings in the region.
There is of course no doubt that my personal research history in
Tajikistan triggered these reactions. Yet it is also likely that people’s
reactions indexed their sense of a shared past between the two places
as part of a common Persianate realm and the possibility of a readily
activatable connectivity, thus re-emphasizing the oscillating rubrics of
intimacy and difference between Karimabad and Khorog.
Nizam, a middle-aged farmer from Karimabad whom I frequently
met in 2013, referred to Ismailis in northern Pakistan as having
received their teachings from Nasir-i Khusraw and his pirs, thereby
contrasting them with ‘Khojas’—that is, the diasporic Gujarati Is-
mailis in Africa, Asia, and theWest. On the one hand, for him, this im-
plied reverence to ancient traditions such as chiragh-rawshan, a funeral
rite that is widely known (if not practised) and attributed to Nasir-i
Khusrawby Ismailis in the broader region.87 On the other hand,Nizam
also saw Nasir-i Khusraw’s teachings as the source of particular ethics
that are based on ‘rational thinking’, as he put it. In this regard,
Nizam foregrounded two views. The first concerned theway he thought
an Ismaili should behave in order to embody principles of ‘rational’
and ‘secular’ thinking: ‘Instead of fasting and performing the hajj, we
should rather watch our eyes, our tongue, our hands, our feet and
85 Beben, ‘Legendary Biographies’.
86 See also A. Iloliev, ‘Pirship in Badakhshan: The Role and Significance of the
Institute of the Religious Masters (Pirs) in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
Wakhan and Shughnan’ Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 6(2), Spring 2013, pp. 155–
175.
87 Beben, ‘Legendary Biographies’, pp. 329–332. H. Elnazarov, ‘The Luminous
Lamp: The Practice of Chiragh-i rawshan among the Ismailis of Central Asia’ in The
Study of Shi’i Islam: History, Theology and Law, F. Daftary and G. Miskinzoda (eds.),
I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2014, pp. 529–541.
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our private parts.’ Thus, in Nizam’s view, a rationally thinking Ismaili,
rather than focusing on extraordinary events, should carefully consider
where to look (and what to look at), what to say, what (and whom) to
touch, where to go, and how to behave sexually in everyday life.
The second aspect concerned his attitude to change, which Nizam
defined as one of the most central aspects of ‘rational thinking’. He
emphasized that being an Ismaili in the broader region meant, in
contradistinction to Sunnis and Twelver Shias, that all teachings
were time-bound and that Ismailism was ultimately a ‘worship of
time’. Nizam’s statements are linked to ethical norms and teachings
that can be found among many Ismaili communities around the
world. However, the interesting point for the exploration of forms
of conviviality across the divide between Tajikistan and Pakistan is
that he specifically tied them to Nasir-i Khusraw as a historical figure
and religious authority of importance in the greater region.
In Khorog, my interlocutors’ statements exhibit a number of
similarities to those I would encounter later on in Karimabad. When
Mamadnazar and Khilvatsho told me about their views on their
‘brothers and sisters’ across the border in Pakistan on that summer
evening in 2011 in Khorog, they also referred to the legacy of Nasir-i
Khusraw that made local Ismailis in the region distinct from other
Muslims. Like Nizam, Khilvatsho highlighted rationality and ethical
behaviour as central features of this distinction. He said ‘We are “God-
knowing” [khudoshinos], but,’ he added disapprovingly, ‘the Sunnis
are “God-worshipping” [khudoparast].’ Similarly, he emphasized the
quality of insof, which ‘means not to do anything bad to other people,
not to tell bad things to others, [and] not to offend anyone’—an
attitude that echoes Nizam’s views on appropriate conduct.
Over the past couple of years, I have encountered a focus on the
ideals of rationality and equity in interactions with Ismailis from
different parts of the world, including Central Asia, East Africa,
Europe, North America, and South Asia. In the course of these
interactions, people often attributed these ideals to the humanitarian
speeches and ‘edicts’ (farman) of the current Aga Khan. Yet my
interlocutors in Khorog and Karimabad simultaneously tied them to
the figure of Nasir-i Khusraw, who is not only part of global Ismaili
discourse and an unifying figure in Tajik nation building, but also a
representative of local distinction across the region’smodern frontiers.
The fact that this allowed people to navigate different scales of Ismaili
identity and emphasize locality while still participating in regional,
national, and transnational discourses is important for understanding
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the processes and dynamics between Karimabad and Khorog. I
observed such multidirectional dynamic encounters in other fields,
too. In the following, I attempt to explore two of these further fields,
namely virtual and physical mobility beyond Karimabad and Khorog.
Meeting places beyond the ‘marginal hubs’
In his work on the Wakhi—split between Afghanistan, China,
Pakistan, and Tajikistan—Hermann Kreutzmann shows that literacy
and the establishment of media platforms (such as cultural societies,
literature, newspapers, and websites) play a decisive role in promoting
a shared ethno-linguistic identity and various forms of conviviality
across present-day political boundaries.88 With regard to Karimabad
and Khorog, such shared platforms do not exist precisely because
their inhabitants speak different languages (Burushaski, Urdu, and
English in Karimabad and Pamir languages, Tajik, and Russian in
Khorog) and are only indirectly connected via the proxies of wider
religious and development networks. While conducting fieldwork in
Tajikistan and Pakistan in summer 2015, I was able to observe how
social media provided an additional dimension to this faraway–nearby
ambivalence that I suggest defines the ephemeral character of
conviviality in these places.
In July and August 2015, massive floods occurred in Gorno-
Badakhshan and various parts of Pakistan, including Gilgit-
Baltistan.89 Media coverage widely attributed these floods to a
combination of heavy rainfall andmelting glaciers due to exceptionally
high temperatures. The deluge caused landslides, blocked roads,
flooded homes, and drowned people. In thewake of the disaster, friends
from both Gorno-Badakhshan and Gilgit-Baltistan shared news via
various types of social media. They therefore engaged in a form
of social-media use that, as Brett Peary, Rajib Shaw, and Yukiko
88 H. Kreutzmann, ‘Sprachenvielfalt und regionale Differenzierung von
Glaubensgemeinschaften imHindukusch-Karakorum’Erdkunde49(2),1995, pp.106–
121. H. Kreutzmann, Ethnizität im Entwicklungsprozess: Die Wakhi in Hochasien, Dietrich
Reimer Verlag, Berlin, 1996. Kreutzmann, Pamirian Crossroads.
89 R. Davies, ‘Tajikistan Floods: 10000 Forced to Evacuate in Gorno-
Badakhshan Region’, Floodlist.com, online: http://floodlist.com/asia/tajikistan-floods-
10000-forced-gorno-badakhsan-region (accessed 9 May 2017), 2015. R. Davies,
‘Pakistan Flood: Death Toll Rises to 69’, Floodlist.com, online: http://floodlist.com/
asia/pakistan-floods-death-toll-rises-to-69 (accessed 9May 2017), 2015.
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Takeuchi note, has become increasingly common around the world
in the aftermath of disasters.90 This form of social-media use also
highlights digital inequality,91 manifest in the uneven distribution of
technological and linguistic resources. A great deal of the news about
the disaster and subsequent discussions in online groups and forums
focused on local developments in Khorog and along the Karakoram
Highway in Hunza, allowing people to perceive the disaster as a real
and shared local experience that transcended national boundaries.92
For instance, Aslisho, a young man from Khorog, introduced his
reposting of an English news article on the floods in northern Pakistan
with the succinct and self-explanatory comment: ‘The same situation.’
Other participants from Gorno-Badakhshan reacted to his statement
and, in the course of the interaction in Russian and Shughni, Aslisho
referred to the region as ‘a place that is historically precious for
our Jamoat [Ismaili community]’. Friends from Hunza, meanwhile,
circulated videos of floods carrying off houses, trees, and roads in
Afghan Badakhshan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan, thus promulgating a
sense of geographical interdependency that was marked by shared
disaster and suffering. At the same time, people throughout Gorno-
Badakhshan and Gilgit-Baltistan linked these events to the global
rise in temperature, thereby attributing broader regional and global
dimensions to their misfortune. Moreover, in October and December
2015, the occurrence of earthquakes in the region93 and real-time
coverage of their effects on social media—including ‘mark safe’ tools
and charity initiatives for victims—further highlighted a type of
connectivity that does not halt at the region’s political boundaries;
it is, rather, part of a much larger scale, connected to continental
drifts and planetary developments.
90 B. D. Peary, R. Shaw, and Y. Takeuchi (2012), ‘Utilization of Social Media in the
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and Its Effectivness’ Journal of Natural Disaster
Science 34(1), 2012, p. 6.
91 E. Hargittai and Y. P. Hsieh, ‘Digital Inequality’ in Oxford Handbook of Internet
Studies, W. H. Dutton (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 129–150.
M. Madianou, ‘Digital Inequality and Second Order Disasters: Social Media in the
Typhoon Haiyan Recovery’ Social Media & Society 1(2), 2015, pp. 1–11.
92 S. Green, P. Harvey, andH.Knox, ‘Scales of Place andNetworks: An Ethnography
of the Imperative to Connect Through Information and Communications
Technologies’ Current Anthropology 46(5), 2015, pp. 805–826.
93 A. Vervaeck, ‘Massive Earthquake: Murghob, Tajikistan on December
7, 2015’, Earthquake-report.com, online: http://earthquake-report.com/2015/12/07/
massive-earthquake-murghob-tajikistan-on-december-7-2015/ (accessed 9 May
2017), 2015.
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In her work on online belonging, Adi Kuntsman is critical of
those who view cyberspace as ‘an unproblematic site of unlimited
possibilities’ that predominantly entails ‘passing and border crossing’,
‘freedom of speech’, and ‘community formations’.94 Instead, she
interprets interactions in cyberspace as shaped by different forms
of violence and processes of exclusion that remain stored as ‘archives
of feelings’.95 Kuntsman’s critique is relevant for an understanding
of what social media might mean for conviviality between Karimabad
and Khorog. Digitally shared experiences beyond the two places bring
them into contact with one another, and communication on such
shared experiences has become part of a growing digital archive
that bears witness to instances of conviviality that can be referenced,
revived, looked at, distributed, and remembered. Yet the very access
to such interactions and the resulting archives are subject to social
and infrastructural forms of exclusion. In this regard, Sarah Green,
Penny Harvey, and Hannah Knox note that it is misleading to posit a
strict division between offline and online spaces, especially as neither
spatial dimension is self-evident.96 In Karimabad and Khorog, the
close interdependency of the two realms is omnipresent. Access to
resources that enable people in both places to even use social media is
dependent on offline conditions that are organized along the politics of
infrastructure, status, class, and privilege. While 3Gmobile networks
and improving Internet connections are being advertised across the
region, in everyday life, people’s access to social media is considerably
slowed down by outdated EDGE technology.97 In addition, various
social-media platforms are regularly blocked, mostly for political
reasons. Finally, insufficient and sporadic electricity supplies, with as
little as three hours of power a day inKarimabad and regular blackouts
in Khorog, make electricity a scarce resource accessible only to those
who have solar panels and generators or who occupy certain social
94 A. Kuntsman, Figurations of Violence and Belonging: Queerness, Migranthood and
Nationalism in Cyberspace and Beyond, Peter Lang, Oxford and Bern, 2009, p. 215.
95 A. Kuntsman, ‘Introduction: Affective Fabrics of Digital Cultures’ in Digital
Cultures and the Politics of Emotion: Feelings, Affect and Technological Change, A.
Karatzogianni and A. Kuntsman (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New
York, 2012, p. 6.
96 Green, Harvey, and Knox, ‘Scales of Place’, p. 806.
97 The acronym EDGE stands for ‘Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution’. It is
a pre-3G mobile technology that operates at a maximum speed of 217 kilobits per
second and thus does not allow people to browse many of the websites that are online
today.
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positions, such as politicians, residents of wealthy neighbourhoods,
and members of reputable families.
Another factor that hinders widespread interaction via media
technology across theAfghanWakhan is the aforementioned linguistic
divide that separates the people of Karimabad from those in
Khorog. Institutions that have developed out of Ismaili educational
and development efforts—such as the Institute of Ismaili Studies
in London and the University of Central Asia—address this split
by offering scholarships to study abroad, placing an emphasis on
achieving fluency in English. The trajectories of mobility that these
educational opportunities have created are not incidental; they are
meant to guide selected people from Karimabad and Khorog towards
a version of globalization that is defined by English as the global lingua
franca and connectivity to urban centres in ‘the West’, all envisaged
as uniting Ismailis from all over the world.98
In the framework of these educational programmes, including
masters’ programmes and teacher training, London has emerged
as an especially salient meeting place. Shared flats and university
dormitories serve as sites of conviviality for people from Karimabad
andKhorog, integrating them into a larger community of Ismailis from
Asia, East Africa, and North America. In the course of this process,
while commonalities are established via shared academic and religious
identities, the ambiguity of originating from nearby yet disconnected
places persists. This plays out not only on the level of ethnic and
linguistic identities, but also reaches into other domains, such as
the sensory dimension of food.99 When my wife and I visited one of
the student dormitories in London in spring 2015 for a dinner with
friends from Pakistan and Tajikistan, food was literally a hot topic of
discussion. The language of conversation was English, supplemented
with sprinkles of Persian that some of the Pakistani students had
learned as part of their study programmes. Differences weremediated
by a common, transnational Ismaili identity, expressed in references
to theology, as well as by the shared experience of studenthood in
London.
98 B. Bolander, ‘English and the Transnational Ismaili Community: Identity, the
Aga Khan and Infrastructure’ Language in Society 45, 2016, pp. 583–604. Bolander,
‘English, Motility and Ismaili Transnationalism’.
99 J. Holtzman, Uncertain Tastes: Memory, Ambivalence, and the Politics of Eating in
Samburu, Northern Kenya, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2009. D. E. Sutton,
Remembrance of Repasts: An Anthropology of Food and Memory, Berg, Oxford and New York,
2001.
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Spicy South Asian curries dominated the evening. Everybody
present agreed that this kind of food does not actually belong
to the high mountains of Pakistan and Tajikistan, where people
traditionally prepare spiceless dishes across all divides. Our friends
from Karimabad and Khorog mentioned that spices were not native
to the region, which they imagined as shared, but had come from the
lowlands of Pakistan. Yet they also revealed their differing historical
and national belonging by expressing either love or distaste for spicy
food. While our friend from Karimabad, who was used to and fond of
spicy Pakistani dishes, thoroughly enjoyed hismeal, ourKhorogi friend
emphasized, to the amusement of the whole group, his pronounced
distaste for the spicy food by making faces. Khorogis generally do
not link spicy food to the historical memories that would make
such dishes, as David Sutton put it, ‘whole’ and thus their own.100
In contrast, spicy food strongly indexes Pakistani, and sometimes
South Asian, belonging, despite regional variations and notions of
cultural domination. Food does not just symbolize different local,
national, and transnational identities (Khorog versus Karimabad,
Pakistan versus Tajikistan, the Indian subcontinent versus Russia),
but also contributes to the embodiment of these differences which,
in everyday life, reach into the domains of clothing, dance, musical
tastes, and so on. These realms, including food, go beyond the symbolic
representation of social bonds and divisions and actually ‘participate in
their creation and recreation’.101 Thus, even in meeting places beyond
Karimabad and Khorog, the conditions of the divided borderlands
continue to exert their particular influences on how people interact,
locate themselves, and envisage the world beyond.
Conclusion
Paul Gilroy’s work is the starting point for many debates
on conviviality. In his 2004 book, After Empire, he seeks to
counter post-9/11 racism and emerging nationalism with a utopian
cosmopolitanism.102 Gilroy envisions a Britain in which the diversity
that the empire has brought forth is embraced rather than ignored
and neglected. Yet, inGilroy’s discussion, the spotlight is always on the
100 Sutton, Remembrance of Repasts, p. 73.
101 Sutton, Remembrance of Repasts, p. 102.
102 Gilroy, After Empire.
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imperial centre and the origins of those strangers who are located at
the heart of the debate remain obscure and far-distant. In this context,
the possibilities of a shared life are merely wishful thinking—amatter
of hope and utopia. In this article, however, I have sought to explore
what happens if we take the idea of ‘convivial culture’ to the fringes of
different empires and political entities. The examples of Karimabad
and Khorog, located at the very crossroads of historical British and
Russian spheres of influence, highlight a series of points that might
contribute to alternate understandings of the dynamics of life across
difference.
The interaction between people who live in or feel connected
to Khorog and Karimabad is determined by processes situated on
different scales. In this regard, the idea of a micro-region uniting
the border area of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan
exists as part of a range of local scale-making projects. It serves
to emphasize local belonging across modern frontiers and a distinct
type of Ismailism. However, the historically more recent and salient
trajectories are tied to imperial and national entities. At the same
time, it is important to emphasize that these different scales are not
necessarily contradictory and at odds with each other. James Scott’s
notion of the ‘non-state spaces’ that accompany such alternate scale-
making projects is only one side of the story.103 As the examples of
Karimabad and Khorog demonstrate, instead of ‘state evasion’, we
see manifold attempts to connect beyond national boundaries—yet
with the nation state lingering, ever at the ready, amidst local and
transnational identities.
Furthermore, throughout the article, I have argued that
Karimabad’s and Khorog’s oscillation between centrality and
marginality is informed by temporal and spatial regimes. I hope
to have shown that marginality within the nation state is not the
only dimension that matters in these places. Rather, like Anna Tsing
(1994: 279), I have sought to look at marginality as a conceptual site
and ‘an analytic placement that makes evident both the constraining,
oppressive quality of cultural exclusion and the creative potential of
rearticulating, enlivening, and rearranging the very social categories
that peripheralize a group’s existence’.104 People in both Karimabad
and Khorog have been subject to long-term projects of developmental
modernism that are variously entangled with state interventions and
103 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed.
104 A. L. Tsing, ‘From the Margins’ Cultural Anthropology 9(3), 1994, p. 279.
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ultimately shed light on reverse interplays of rural and urban areas.105
In this respect, the Soviet project and Ismaili endeavours reveal
parallels, but they also constitute separating forces.
The politics of nostalgia that have emerged from these processes
situate conviviality across the Wakhan divide in the past and in the
future, yet ascribe to the present a merely fragmentary character.
This is also linked to the unequally distributed capacities to connect.
Despite local agency in many fields, a good share of the power to
decide on the possibility of conviviality across the divide lies not in
local hands, but in those of the political actors and development
institutions that administer border and transport infrastructures,
communication systems,mobility, and education. Political authorities,
both local and acting from afar, as well as the figure of the Aga Khan
IV and the overarching identity that global Ismaili institutions foster,
are intricately entangled with this hierarchy of distribution. This is
perhaps best exemplified by the fact that, in order to encounter a
state of shared everyday life, a common language, and face-to-face
interaction, people from Karimabad and Khorog seek institutionally
regimented educational pathways that create spaces of encounter in
distant places like London, removed from their own homes so close to
one another and yet so far away.
105 H. Jonsson, ‘Above and Beyond: Zomia and the Ethnographic Challenge of/for
Regional History’ History and Anthropology 21(2), 2010, pp. 191–212.
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